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Abstract
This paper concludes a special feature of Sustainability Science that explores a broad range of social value theoretical traditions, such as religious studies, social psychology, indigenous knowledge, economics, sociology, and philosophy. We introduce a novel transdisciplinary conceptual framework that revolves around concepts of ‘lenses’ and ‘tensions’ to help navigate
value diversity. First, we consider the notion of lenses: perspectives on value and valuation along diverse dimensions that
describe what values focus on, how their sociality is envisioned, and what epistemic and procedural assumptions are made.
We characterise fourteen of such dimensions. This provides a foundation for exploration of seven areas of tension, between:
(1) the values of individuals vs collectives; (2) values as discrete and held vs embedded and constructed; (3) value as static
or changeable; (4) valuation as descriptive vs normative and transformative; (5) social vs relational values; (6) different
rationalities and their relation to value integration; (7) degrees of acknowledgment of the role of power in navigating value
conflicts. In doing so, we embrace the ‘mess’ of diversity, yet also provide a framework to organise this mess and support and
encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration. We identify key research areas where such collaborations can be harnessed
for sustainability transformation. Here it is crucial to understand how certain social value lenses are privileged over others
and build capacity in decision-making for understanding and drawing on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses.
Keywords Shared values · Relational values · Environmental values · Knowledge brokering · Epistemology ·
Interdisciplinarity · Ecosystem services · Nature’s contributions to people

Introduction
Social values inquiry draws upon a rich range and depth of
theoretical traditions, each with its own assumptions related
to how values are conceptualised, elicited and related to
other constructs. This paper concludes a Special Feature
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of Sustainability Science that has brought together a broad
range of these traditions. We seek to build bridges across
these traditions, considering their diverse social value lenses
and areas of tension between them. We embrace the ‘mess’
of diversity, yet also bring an innovative framing to this mess
to support and encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration for social values as a key concern of the environmental
social sciences (Chan et al. 2018, Ives and Kendal 2014;
Kenter et al. 2014a, 2015, 2016a; Kronenberg 2014; Pascual
et al. 2017; Parks and Gowdy, 2013; Rawluk et al. 2017;
Raymond et al. 2014, 2019; Scholte et al. 2015; van Riper
et al. 2017).
Researchers and practitioners conceptualise social values in ways that connect to particular understandings of
the world based on history, culture, geography, experience,
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Fig. 1  Social values as lenses on what matters: what is or should be
important to us, about, in and as the world, with two types of metalenses: the epistemic lens and procedural lens, and the dimensions
(Table 1) of value associated with the three types of lenses. The
value lens is depicted in two parts, with broad, transcendental val-

ues guiding specific, contextual values and their indicators. While
value lenses and objects of worthiness are depicted as separate entities, whether they are assumed separable will differ per epistemic lens
(hence porous boundary of value lens)

and embodiment (Williams 2014). This means that no single disciplinary framework can fully integrate the many
understandings of social values. We adopt a post-normal
view grounded in epistemic pluralism that suggests there
is no ‘one correct way’ of conceptualising social values;
each provides a limited perspective to be scrutinised in
democratic debate and decision-making (Funtowicz and
Ravetz 1993; Ainscough et al. 2018). Post-normal science addresses complex, wicked problems, where facts are
uncertain, stakes are high, and decisions are urgent. Today’s
deeply challenging environmental sustainability issues provide a prime example. Here, the choices about what and how
we research are inherently normative, because all problem
descriptions partially result from the value lenses through
which issues are viewed. Different lenses give rise to competing knowledge claims, which can be addressed through
deliberative processes of knowledge co-production that
extend peer review from expert-only to a transdisciplinary
community also involving practitioners, policy makers and
citizens (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; Strand 2017).
In this paper, we develop a novel transdisciplinary conceptual framework to help navigate the messy reality of

social values research and practice. Central to this framework is a consideration of social values as lenses of worthiness: lenses of what is considered to matter. Underpinning
these lenses sit diverse meta-lenses, which explain how values are conceived and assessed. We highlight two key types
of meta-lens; the epistemic lens and the procedural lens
(Fig. 1). We identify fourteen dimensions along which the
different social value lenses and meta-lenses of diverse theoretical traditions can be discriminated (Table 1). Armed with
this framework, we then investigate central areas of tension
between different social value theoretical traditions, identifying key avenues for future research. These tensions emerged
from a deliberative global expert workshop in York, UK, in
June 2018 (Box 1; also see Eriksson et al. 2019), to which
authors representing each of the papers within this Feature
were invited. The papers were submitted in response to an
open call for contributions (Raymond et al. 2018). They
draw on a wide variety of theoretical bases, highlighting the
importance of social values as a boundary concept (Kenter
2016a; Steger et al. 2018).
This is the first paper to present a comprehensive framework for drawing together knowledge across the wide
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At what scale are values being
expressed?

What is the scale of the values being
expressed?

Scale of values

What does one mean by ‘values’?

Value lens
Value concept

(Scale of) value provider

Key question

Value dimension

Relevance to transcendental and/
or contextual values and indicators

Transcendental values: broad, overarch- N/A
ing life goals and principles; not associated with particular context-specific
objects of value
Contextual values: specific opinions
about importance, which are dependent
on a context-specific object of value
and hence contextual and attitudinal
Value indicators: an indicator of the
importance of something specific (e.g.
monetary, non-monetary and biophysical measures, qualitative indicators
such as a ‘verdict’ from a citizens’
jury)
Both
Values are expressed by individuals or
by ‘social’ or collective valuing agents,
at the scale of groups, communities,
cultures or societies as a whole
Values can be expressed at the individual Both
scale (e.g. how much does something
benefit an individual?) or at aggregated
or pre-aggregated social scales such
as value to society (e.g. how much
does something benefit the people of
Mato Grosso?). Values may also be
expressed at different temporal scales
(e.g. in economics, the net present
value over a 20-year vs 100-year
timespan). With regard to transcendental values, people may have different
values in relation to different scales,
e.g. one might value a varied life for
oneself, but in relation to society other
values such as fairness or responsibility
might be more important

Description and categories

Section “Scales and aggregation: the
relations between individual and social
values”

Section “Scales and aggregation: the
relations between individual and social
values”

Section “Social value lenses and dimensions of social values”

Further discussion

Table 1  Key dimensions of values that serve to differentiate value lenses and meta-lenses of diverse knowledge traditions, with where applicable reference to the section of this paper where they
are further discussed in relation to tensions between different traditions

Sustainability Science (2019) 14:1439–1461
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Values can be abstract and generalisable Both
(e.g. monetary values, the Schwartz
system of transcendental values), or
concrete, place-based and idiosyncratic

What frame of the (natural) world does
the value express?

How are values justified?

What degree of abstraction are values
conceived of?

Value frame

Value justification

Epistemic lens
Abstractness

Both
People may harbour values with regard
to themselves (self-regarding values),
others (other-regarding values, or both
(reciprocal values). Intention of values
may differ depending on the role and
context in which values are expressed
(e.g. as consumers, in public policy
contexts, in relationships of care). This
dimension can apply to interpretations
of the content of value and to conceptual assumptions (e.g. the assumption that values are self-regarding in
neoclassical economics)
Both
People live from the world in that they
gain their sustenance from it, in the
world as their home and stage of life,
with the world as the natural backdrop
of life beyond us, and as the world in
terms of oneness between people and
nature, such as experienced through
kinship, embodiment and spirituality.
These perspectives can relate to the
content of values but also to whether
people–nature relations are conceived
of through a subject–object dichotomy,
or a nondual or relational perspective
The way that values are justified, where Contextual values
objects of value are substitutable means
to a human end (instrumental values),
constitutive of non-substitutable meaningful relationships to people (relational values), or ends in themselves
without reference to people as valuers
(intrinsic values)

Who is being regarded with the expression of values?

Relevance to transcendental and/
or contextual values and indicators

Value intention

Description and categories

Key question

Value dimension

Table 1  (continued)

Section “Abstractness and constructedness: social values as discrete and preformed vs embedded and constructed”

Section “Value justifications and frames:
shared, social and relational values and
our relationship with the natural world”

Section “Value justifications and frames:
shared, social and relational values and
our relationship with the natural world”

Section “Normativity and intention: valuation as descriptive vs normative”

Further discussion
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What process is used to elicit values?

How are values aggregated?

Procedural lens
Elicitation

Aggregation

Rationality

Normativity

Both
Values may be elicited through a nondeliberative process (stated values)
or through an individual, dialectic or
social deliberative process (deliberated
values), or values may be expressed
through, manifested in and elicited
from behaviour (revealed, lived and
embodied values)
To achieve values at the social scale they Contextual values
may be either pre-aggregated or aggregated from individuals. This dimension
also points to the meta-values used that
inform the aggregation procedure or
function

Both
Are values pre-formed and stable or situ- Values can be assumed as: (1) entiationally constructed and changeable?
ties that are ‘held’, ‘pre-formed’ and
stable, or (2) partially pre-constructed
as proto-values that are activated and
become formed in a situation, or (3)
fully situationally constructed when
manifested in life and in particular
valuation contexts, and thus changeable
according to situations
Both
Is assessment of values seen as objective Whether the understanding of social
and value-neutral, or normative?
values is perceived as a critical, emancipatory, and potentially transformative
affair or as an objective, empirical
exercise, which may nonetheless
include the observation of transformative social values
Contextual values
How is rationality conceived of?
Rather than relating to ethical justification, this dimension points to assumptions around the validity of values
with regard to rationality. Examples of
different perspectives include instrumental, communicative and bounded
rationality

Relevance to transcendental and/
or contextual values and indicators

Constructedness

Description and categories

Key question

Value dimension

Table 1  (continued)

Section “Scales and aggregation: the
relations between individual and social
values”

Section “Abstractness and constructedness: social values as discrete and preformed vs embedded and constructed”

Section “Value integration and rationalities”

Section “Normativity and intention: valuation as descriptive vs normative”

Sections “Abstractness and constructedness: social values as discrete and preformed vs embedded and constructed”,
“Constructedness and value change:
social values as stable vs changeable”

Further discussion

Sustainability Science (2019) 14:1439–1461
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Power

To what degree are values seen as commensurable and compatible?

The degree to which values can be inte- Contextual values
grated depends on their (1) commensurability—the degree to which values
can in principle be characterised using
the same measure, or at least meaningfully compared with each other; and
(2) compatibility, the degree to which
they practically address the same thing.
Where values are entirely incommensurable and/or incompatible, integration
is not possible and values can only be
considered in parallel
Both
The degree to which researchers and
How are conflict, power and justice
practitioners consider the institutional
considered in the articulation and elicinature of value conflicts—conflicts
tation of value?
between values, as well as concepts
of values and their underpinning
epistemic assumptions—and account
for differentials in power associated
with multiple values and value lenses
and meta-lenses. Values may be treated
as power-neutral or as reflecting
power differences. This dimension
also highlights the degree to which
different forms of justice (distributive,
retributive, recognition, procedural) are
considered in dealing with conflict

Relevance to transcendental and/
or contextual values and indicators

Integration

Description and categories

Key question

Value dimension

Table 1  (continued)

Section “Values, conflict and power”

Section “Value integration and rationalities”

Further discussion
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range of traditions that consider social values of sustainability, from more realist to more relativist, from positivist
to diverse interpretivist and critical approaches. However,
rather than rehash well-known spectra of ontology and epistemology, we identify specific tensions to more precisely
investigate key pinch points in relation to social values and
valuation. While we focus on environmental sustainability,
our contribution may also benefit other fields where social
values are a key concern, such as energy and health.
The exploration of tensions between theoretical traditions is an opportunity for personal and collective growth
and a means for advancing scholarship, not least because
it highlights different understandings of and approaches to
social values that may not be self-evident when those from
different backgrounds collaborate. Tensions and lenses need
to be explicitly and rigorously considered if the goal is to
incorporate a diversity of worldviews into environmental
decision-making, as proposed by, for example, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) (Pascual et al. 2017; Díaz et al.
2018; Christie et al. 2019b). The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change has long been heavily dominated by natural science worldviews, but also here there are demands for
a more diverse knowledge base and challenging implicit
social value lenses (Hulme 2011; Ford et al. 2016). Through
a mutual recognition of differences, viewing sustainability
issues through different lenses of social values provides a
richer and more comprehensive picture and can offer a more
inclusive and more relevant value-evidence basis for sustainability transformation. Thus, we clarify issues at the frontier
of social values for sustainability in the light of these tensions, providing a forward-looking and constructive agenda
for transdisciplinary engagement with sustainability science.

Box 1: Deliberation process within the author team
An open call for Special Feature abstracts was publicised
in February 2018 in Sustainability Science (Raymond et al.
2018). Forty-seven submissions were received, of which 18
were selected by the co-editors (CR, AR, CvR, DK, JK)
based on criteria including academic quality from peer
review of abstracts, disciplinary and geographic diversity,
and gender balance. An author from each paper was invited
to attend a workshop at the University of York, UK, funded
by the Valuing Nature Programme. The goals of the workshop were to identify linkages across papers, facilitate deliberation on broader social values knowledge across diverse
disciplines, and synthesise this new knowledge in a collective article. A diversity of perspectives were represented,
including environmental science and ecology, human geography, sociology, psychology, ecological and mainstream
economics, anthropology, philosophy, and business and
religious studies.

1445

The first day of the workshop involved five sessions, each
containing three paper presentations and 45 min discussion.
At the conclusion of each session, workshop participants
added their individual reflections to an online interface. The
co-editors distilled these insights into five sets of topics:
(1) value scales and hierarchies; (2) integration, plurality
and conflict; (3) values and value-activation; (4) power and
value change; and (5) overall conceptualisation of social
values. The following day, participants deliberated on these
topic sets in small subgroups over the course of two discussion sessions facilitated by the co-editors, allowing each
participant to engage with two sets in detail and learn from
the group’s insights. Each subgroup focused on identifying areas of tension between different knowledge traditions
and their lenses, and future directions for research. A final
plenary session further refined tensions, and identified key
conclusions and cross-linkages. Following the workshop,
reports from each subgroup were prepared, which were
further elaborated into mini-articles by subgroups of the
authors through collaboration and discussion via email and
videoconference. The lead author (JK) and co-editors then
iteratively reorganised the partially overlapping content of
these outputs into the structure of lenses, dimensions and
tensions as presented here.

Social value lenses and dimensions of social
values
There are many understandings of social values. Central
understandings include values as overarching principles,
values pertaining to a common good or society as a whole,
and values that become shared through processes of socialisation, including deliberation and internalisation (Kenter
et al. 2015; van Riper et al. 2018; Ishihara 2018). Diverse
knowledge and appraisal traditions each harbour one or more
social value lenses. These lenses articulate both what values
are focused upon and how their sociality is envisioned. The
lenses of diverse traditions can be characterised and differentiated along multiple dimensions of social values, such as
the scale of values or the process by which they are elicited
(Table 1). For example, a research tradition may focus on
values at the societal scale, expressed by a social unit larger
than an individual (e.g. a local community) and/or through
a social process (e.g. a group workshop). In addition, different traditions harbour meta-lenses (Fig. 1), comprising
specific theories and bodies of scientific or local and indigenous knowledge that articulate different perspectives on
social valuation, with their own epistemologies and explicit
or implicit meta-values: values about values, for example,
about how values should be aggregated (Kenter et al. 2016a).
Meta-lenses thus frame the social perspective and position
of the viewer with respect to how social values and their
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dynamics are perceived and expressed. We consider social
value lenses and meta-lenses to be a dynamic medium of
perception, articulation and understanding through which
the world is interpreted and evaluated: they are therefore
open, reflexive and responsive, and not fixed, unidirectional
or unchanging.
Meta-lenses also help us understand how social value
lenses are associated with and applied to different purposes,
exemplified by the diverse papers in this Special Feature.
Some meta-lenses focus on understanding relations between
values and behaviour (van Riper et al. 2019), others are
geared towards value formation and co-construction (Kenter
et al. 2016c; Calcagni et al. 2019); lived values (Brear and
Mbonane 2019); values embedded in cultural institutions
(Gould et al. 2019; Ives and Kidwell 2019; Christie et al.
2019b); or value-awareness and activation in relation to
wellbeing and sustainability (Raymond and Raymond 2019).
Other meta-lenses are critical and emancipatory (O’Connor
and Kenter 2019; Ravenscroft 2019). Finally, some are themselves associated with studying how meta-lenses are adopted
in valuation institutions (Rawluk et al. 2019; Horcea-Milcu
et al. 2019; Massenberg 2019).
While a complete discussion of the knowledge paradigms
embedded within differing meta-lenses of diverse traditions is beyond the scope of this paper, the teleological or
purposeful nature of social value lenses can be explained by
two key types of meta-lens: the epistemic and procedural
meta-lens (Fig. 1), or, for brevity, simply epistemic lens and
procedural lens. The epistemic lens considers how we harbour, create and know ‘value’, as well as the philosophical
orientation of knowledge traditions that guides researchers’
social value lenses. The procedural lens describes the types
of processes used to attain and explain social values.
To help understand similarities and tensions between
different social value traditions, we consider a range of
dimensions of their value, epistemic and procedural lenses
(Table 1). Here we build on foundational work by Kenter
et al. (2014a, 2015), who developed a framework for differentiating between types of social values according to how
they have been conceived in different traditions. At the basis
of this lies differentiation between broad, transcendental and
specific, contextual values and their indicators. Transcendental values are broad notions of what is important in life;
they are not attached to a context-specific object of value
and serve to guide specific, contextual values. For example,
a broad desire for harmony with nature might lead us to
express context-specific opinions of value around conserving a particular habitat, which may be assessed in terms of
quantitative or qualitative indicators through some form of
valuation. It is important to note that transcendental values,
while they transcend the specific contexts where we ascribe
importance to particular things, are by definition generalisable or divorced from cultural contexts more broadly. For
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example, what constitutes harmony, nature, and harmony
with nature might be conceived of quite differently between
different cultures. In practice, transcendental and contextual
values can be closely entwined, particularly where transcendental values are strongly embedded in particular relationships (including with non-humans) and not meaningfully
separable from the importance ascribed to those relationships (Gould et al. 2019).
This nomenclature extended research by Rokeach (1973)
that differentiated ‘held’ values (i.e. guiding principles and
life goals) and ‘assigned’ values (i.e. opinions on the values
of particulars), where the first were thought to predict the
latter, both through the process of deduction and a relational
realm of felt experiences (Schroeder 2013). However, Kenter
et al. (2015) noted that opinions on the values of particulars could semantically be both held and assigned, and that
values might thirdly refer to measures and other indicators.
Further, the terms held and assigned have come to be associated with a particular knowledge tradition, which makes
implicit epistemic assumptions that values are pre-formed,
discretely observable mental entities. These assumptions are
shared by some but contested by other traditions (we will
discuss this further in the next section). Thus, transcendental and contextual should not just be seen as new terms for
Rokeach’s old concepts, but along with indicators as a way
to distinguish between the three main meanings of the word
value that does not seek to prejudice towards the implicit
epistemic assumptions associated with the idea that values
can be held or assigned.
Kenter et al. (2015) also discriminated between different
types of shared and social values along dimensions of value
provider, scale, intention, and elicitation process. To provide for a framework that can tackle knowledge of a broader
multidisciplinary nature, such as reflected in this feature and
other important recent knowledge developments in the field
(e.g. a special issue of Current Opinion on Environmental
Sustainability on relational values; Chan et al. 2018), we
add further dimensions and organise them in relation to the
value, epistemic and procedural lenses (Fig. 1; Table 1). We
add two dimensions associated with the value lens: value
frame and value justification. These dimensions categorise
values in relation to framings of how the world matters to
people and differentiate between intrinsic, relational and
instrumental values. Within the epistemic lens, abstractness,
constructedness, normativity and rationality denote whether
values are considered abstract or place-based, pre-formed or
constructed, descriptive or normative, and which conception
of rationality justifies them. Associated with the procedural
lens, the closely related dimensions of aggregation, integration and power denote differences in the way that value
plurality and conflict are perceived and managed.
As an example of the relations among value, epistemic and procedural lenses, and some of their associated

Sustainability Science (2019) 14:1439–1461

dimensions, in this feature O’Connor and Kenter (2019)
investigated a particular type of social values, ‘articulated
intrinsic values’, focusing on marine ecosystems employing ethnographic stakeholder interviews. The social value
lens was the worthiness of the ‘more-than-human’ world,
reflecting other-regarding values on the dimension of intention, individual and communal values in terms of scale, and
intrinsic values in relation to justification (Table 1). The
underpinning epistemic lens in this research was interpretivist and perspectivist. This lens characterised values as
place-based and situationally constructed on the dimensions
of abstractness and constructedness, and the dimension of
normativity highlights an epistemic lens that seeks to emancipate the more-than-human world. The authors deployed
a procedural lens along the dimensions of elicitation and
aggregation that highlighted the purpose of the exercise as
feeding into a deliberative democratic process that should be
used to weigh and aggregate the different values expressed.
The procedural lens thus emphasised meta-values of participation, deliberation and, in relation to the power dimension, fairness in terms of procedural and recognition justice,
through which the social value lens of articulated intrinsic
values was considered.
We do not claim this new set of dimensions fully and
finally articulates all possible lenses and meta-lenses across
the vast diversity of social values literature. However, it
reflects a substantial extension and evolution of understanding from Kenter et al. (2015), which was largely grounded
in ecological economics, to a much more comprehensive
interdisciplinary underpinning.
Combining and comparing social values across theoretical traditions can lead to tensions, because these traditions
utilise different social value lenses and meta-lenses reflecting differences in the way values are conceived, elicited and
applied. Following Goldstein (2015), a commitment to conceptual and theoretical openness in interdisciplinary teams
generates conceptual tension at various levels, to diverse
degrees, and to variable effects. In turn, tension and conflict
open up established theories and concepts for dialogue and
revision. Lenses and tensions are closely related, because
lenses can be seen as a key source of tension, or conversely,
are themselves characterised by one’s position in areas of
tension. Thus, the notion of lenses and tensions across different dimensions provide a useful means of scaffolding to
‘frame the mess’ of diversity in the broad field of social
values.
Tensions can arise at the level of the content of values,
value lenses, and meta-lenses. For example, a typical conflict between pro-development and pro-conservation values
is not just a matter of valuing different things, as what values
are included will be different depending on the dimensions
of the value lens used, such as its scale (e.g. individual,
communal, societal), and on the epistemic and procedural
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meta-lens underpinning it, such as in terms of what value
justifications are considered and how questions of value
aggregation and power are addressed.
We discuss seven key areas of tension. We focus on the
following, gradually shifting emphasis from ontology of
social values to their application: (1) social values as aggregated from the individual scale vs being pre-aggregated at
a social scale (related to the value provider, scale of values,
and aggregation dimensions); (2) social values as discrete,
pre-formed and held vs being embedded, implicit, and constructed through their manifestation in deliberation and
action; and (3) values as static or changeable (both related to
the constructedness dimension); (4) social values through a
descriptive vs normative lens (intention and normativity); (5)
the relations between social, shared, relational, intrinsic and
instrumental values (frame and justification dimensions); (6)
tensions relating to value integration; and (7) tensions in the
degree to which power is acknowledged in navigating value
conflict (power dimension).

Tensions in the theory and practice of social
values
Scales and aggregation: the relations
between individual and social values
The first area of tension arises from a basic question: what
makes social values social? Although interpreted differently, essentially the idea of values being social relates to
society. This raises the question of how society and its values are represented, particularly whether societal values are
considered an independent construct or an aggregation of
individual values. Thus far, most lenses have either focused
on individualistic or collective indicators, and there is only
limited understanding of the relations between them (Kenter
et al. 2014a).
Some social values cannot be reduced to the individual
scale of expression. As an example, take the UK Marine
Policy Statement, which formalises a “shared vision” of
“clean, healthy, safe, productive and biologically diverse
oceans and seas”.1 This signifies shared social values across
value lens dimensions: the statement was made by governments to represent society as a whole and express transcendental values at the social scale, established through a social
process. Individuals are socialised: therefore all individual
values reflect social values to a certain degree (Kenter et al.
2015). Individuals may also experience, represent and enact
shared values such as expressed by the policy statement

1

https : //www.gov.uk/gover n ment / publi c atio n s/uk-marin e -polic
y-statement.
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Fig. 2  Different ways of conceiving the relation between social values (as value to society in terms of contextual values, and as values
in relation to society in terms of transcendental values) and individual
values: as a distinct but overlapping sets of values; b social values as

a subset of the aggregate of individual values; c social values as (partially) predicting individual values; d social values as (partially) predicted by individual values; and e social values in dynamic interplay
with individual values

above. However, how can individual values be aggregated
to form social values?
The relationship between individual values and social
values at a societal scale (i.e. as value to society in terms
of contextual values, and as values in relation to society
in terms of transcendental values), can be thought of in at
least five ways, which inform different social value lenses
(Fig. 2). In Fig. 2a, at the contextual value level, the aggregate of individual and social values are different but may
overlap, while at the transcendental level people may express
multiple sets of potentially overlapping and clashing values (e.g. consumer values vs citizen values; Kenyon et al.

2001). The second perspective is that of a nested diagram
(Fig. 2b), which indicates that any method of aggregating
values, whether through analytical approaches or deliberative processes, is bound to exclude some, typically because
of power relations (Ernstson 2013; Hockley 2014; OrchardWebb et al. 2016). Under this model, social values are
always a subset of the pool of individual values and rarely
approximate the totality of pooled values. The third and
fourth figures (Fig. 2c, d) depict a causal relationship, where
either social values predict individual ones or vice versa
(e.g. van Riper et al. 2019). This reflects the view that individuals represent their society, but consider it through their

13

Sustainability Science (2019) 14:1439–1461

1449

Fig. 3  Conceptual model showing there are multiple levels of
value providers—including individual, group, community, and cultural—that have different configurations of individual and aggregated values as reflected by the multi-coloured units within each
sphere. The different levels interact through feedbacks that amplify

or dampen the relationships of values and the boundaries between
them, which are permeable. Internalisation and socialisation are the
key processes that facilitate the scaling up and down of values within
hierarchies of value providers

individual perceptions and experiences. The fifth (Fig. 2e)
is a dynamic view of causal relationships, whereby individual values and shared social values can be seen as situated within a dynamic interplay where values ‘transfer’ from
various social to individual provider levels and vice versa
(e.g. Fordham and Robinson 2019).
Further research on the interrelations between individual
and social values is needed within and across each of the
five models in Fig. 2. Also, comparative research between
the overlapping, nested, causal, and dynamic perspectives
will be of particular value in considering what factors influence the difference between (aggregate) individual and (preaggregated) social values, and how values transfer between
these levels. Moreover, the use of more than one model will
likely provide added insight into complex and contested
issues, as investigation of shared values is particularly salient in situations of social conflict and disagreement among
interest groups (Kenter et al. 2014b). All of these models
are sensitive to the differences between aggregate individual
and social values, and as such, it is important for policy
and practice to recognise what might influence degrees of
difference, and how these differences relate with associated
lenses used to assess values. Greater understanding of the
differences between aggregated individual values and social
values will also enable researchers to identify appropriate
methods for establishing a more comprehensive perspective.
Extending the ontological tension between (aggregated)
individual and social values, we further complicate this
relationship and distinguish social values across multiple
levels of value providers. Relationships between individual
and social values function within complex systems can be
organised hierarchically (van Riper et al. 2018). Previous
research has identified and grouped values provided at the
individual, group (extended) community, and whole culture
and society levels (Manfredo et al. 2014; Kenter et al. 2015)

that accommodate interactions within these hierarchies. In
line with arguments that values ‘scale up’ to higher levels (Kendal and Raymond, 2019), the values expressed by
groups are in part an aggregate of individuals’ values but
may also be entirely new ‘emergent’ phenomena (Fig. 3). In
addition to this ontological tension between individual values and values of larger social units, there are practical tensions between values that exist at different provider levels.
This tension is generated by value hierarchies in finding sustainability solutions, as well as processes for aligning values
across multiple scales such as the need for decision-making
processes to prioritise between the values of smaller versus
larger collectives. This is further complicated by different
procedural lenses on the commensurability and compatibility of values and lenses (see section “Constructedness and
value change: social values as stable vs changeable”), and on
how to navigate conflict and address power issues (see section “Value integration and rationalities”).
We distinguish two mechanisms by which values are
transferred between levels. The first is socialisation, and it
occurs over extended periods of time (Ishihara 2018) as well
as when values are formed in shorter-term social processes,
such as group deliberation (Kenter et al. 2016c; Kendal and
Raymond 2019). The values that emerge from socialisation
can be solidified through social learning and social norms
that regulate practices within a collective (Irvine et al.
2016). The second is internalisation. Over time, individuals
observe interpersonal dynamics and adjust their orientations
to align with a group (Calcagni et al. 2019, van Riper et al.
2018). This is grounded in personal reflections and intraindividual deliberation. Together, these mechanisms can
yield changes in systemic understanding of others’ values,
improved capacity for individuals to recognise their own orientations, and knowledge of why changes in values occur at
different levels of social organisation (Kenter et al. 2016c).
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Future research should explore how values are shifted
when moving across different hierarchical levels. This is particularly relevant in light of sustainability transitions because
the scaling up and down of values reflects the continuously
changing conditions in society and offers an opportunity to
ensure the incorporation of multiple values into decisionmaking (also see Fordham and Robinson 2019).

Abstractness and constructedness: social
values as discrete and pre‑formed vs embedded
and constructed
An in important tension between different epistemic lenses
revolves around whether values are believed to exist as discrete entities, pre-formed and held by people, or as only
coming into existence when manifested, including in deliberation (Ravenscroft 2019) and as ‘lived values’ in individual and collective behaviour (Brear and Mbonane 2019,
Gould et al. 2019). In terms of contextual values, valuation
researchers have pointed out these are frequently poorly
formed in unfamiliar environmental contexts (Jobstvogt
et al. 2014a, b; Urama and Hodge 2006). However, there is
also a tension in the conception of transcendental values as:
(1) held as, (a) relatively singular and stable across a human
lifespan, or (b) multiple sets of contextually activated values;
or (2) not held but constructed and manifested in response
to individual, group and social–ecological context. This tension also relates to the dimension of abstractness associated
with epistemic lenses and discussed in more detail by Rawluk et al. (2019). This dimension clarifies whether values
are seen to be: (1) distinctly isolated as an abstract, discrete
entity (e.g. in this feature van Riper et al. 2019; Christie
et al. 2019a); or (2) not abstractable from broader cultural
constructs such as worldviews, cosmologies or narratives,
and, in relation to specific values, places, without losing
meaning (e.g. in this feature Gould et al. 2019; O’Connor
and Kenter 2019; Ives and Kidwell 2019).
The tension between epistemic lenses that see social values as abstract, discrete and held vs embedded, situationally constructed and manifested has important implications
for social valuation: from the first perspective, associated
with for example social psychology, conventional economics and public participation GIS, values are considered as
self-existing mental entities that can be isolated and interrogated. In other perspectives, associated with humanities and
deliberative ecological economics, values are understood as
embedded in cultural and institutional contexts. Here the
language of value ‘capture’ becomes inappropriate (Ravenscroft 2019). These latter perspectives are also less likely to
see values within a power vacuum, rather considering them
as part of an institutional setup shaped by discursive structures of power and knowledge—we will return to questions
of power in “Value integration and rationalities”.
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Some synthesis between the two positions is possible
through the concept of proto-values (Kenter et al. 2016a),
where people neither hold fully formed values nor are they
an evaluative tabula rasa. Proto-values mediate between the
transcendental (broad) and contextual (specific) concepts of
values, and between the abstract and pre-formed and constructed and situated. They are not fully formed values but
exist as a broad value-inclination or attitude that becomes
more moulded by and embedded within context through a
key set of institutional and contextual process factors, which
can include the lens and meta-lenses of the particular social
values tradition. Proto-values provide an avenue for allowing
some generalisation, whilst acknowledging valuation as a
process of value formation that is highly context-dependent.
However, the concept is in need of further development and
empirical exploration.
Constructedness and embeddedness also raise questions
about the social and spatiotemporal scales within which
this embedding is situated. Scales influence how research
is conducted and looking through differing spatiotemporal
value lenses can yield conflicting perspectives on sustainability solutions (Gunton et al. 2014). Future research should
be sensitive to the effects of spatial and temporal variation
in values and focus on mechanisms that can bridge multiple spatiotemporal lenses. Deliberative and interpretive
participatory mapping exercises could consider how spatially explicit social values are culturally and institutionally
embedded. This approach could also provide insight on how
values map onto the geographies of relevant environmental
conditions, evaluate how group deliberation can synthesise
values across a range of spatiotemporal scales, and reconcile
mismatches between scales of people’s values and ecosystem
processes. Furthermore, the degree to which values are seen
as isolatable from the contexts of place, time and culture
will influence the types of interventions that are considered:
whether it makes sense to develop generalised interventions
focused specifically on encouraging pro-environmental values, or whether they should be highly situated and placebased, or focus on a value formation process that is geared
towards activation and translation of proto-values to particular contexts.

Constructedness and value change: social values
as stable vs changeable
A further tension related to the epistemic dimension of constructedness is whether values are perceived as stable or
changeable. This is of particular importance and increasing
debate within the sustainability field, because the degree to
which values are pre-formed and stable will more generally
determine the usefulness of interventions targeting values
(e.g. mindfulness or targeted deliberations) as a strategy
for sustainability transformation. This debate within the
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context of pro-environmental value and behaviour change
is most relevant to consideration of transcendental values.
These are generally seen as more stable than contextual values (Schwartz et al. 2012), yet they are expressed to different degrees depending on the salience of issues (Trope and
Liberman 2010) and centrality to the evaluator’s identity
(Stets and Burke 2000). Both across and within traditions
such as social psychology, deliberative ecological economics and sociology, different procedural and epistemic
lenses conflict in terms of their perceptions on how easily
transcendental values can be changed (e.g. Manfredo et al.
2017; Raymond and Kenter 2016; Everard et al. 2016; Ives
and Fischer 2017). Others argue that a notable gap between
transcendental values and actions (Kollmuss and Agyeman
2002) makes this mission irrelevant. That is, while values
may activate certain behavioural intentions, constraints
posed by people’s environments limit their expression. In
contrast, the positive psychology literature (Raymond and
Raymond 2019) does not focus on value change but instead
on individuals acting congruently with their values, with
congruence associated with higher wellbeing and psychological health. This literature brings a strong focus to how
values are operationalised and behaviourally manifested
in different contexts and to awareness raising processes to
deliberate on and express values within context, including
specific decision-making processes. Drawing on Bardi and
Goodwin (2011), awareness raising represents a ‘priming’
process for value change and/or expression. Awareness
raising processes can be considered across two pathways:
a healthy values pathway whereby certain value types are
associated with healthy outcomes for the individual, and
a value activation pathway which considers whether selfidentified values are congruently expressed (Raymond and
Raymond 2019). Mindfulness, operationalised as (1) awareness (‘what is mindfulness’), (2) skill (mindful awareness
of values in decision-making) and (3) mindset (mindful
orientation), is a way to promote wellbeing and sustainable
behaviour through the pathway of value activation. Mindfulness has thus emerged as an important process variable to
understand the elicitation and expression of values (Wamsler
et al. 2018) with clear relevance for sustainability science.
However, thus far the value lens of positive psychology has
almost solely focused on internalisation with individuals. To
act as mediator for value change at the communal, cultural
and societal level, mindfulness also needs to be linked to
socialisation processes.
Sustainability science is increasingly focused on the
causes and effects of change, and values can be conceived
of as both a driver and an outcome of that change. Societal
values form the foundation of institutional rules and knowledge systems that are part of managing and governing natural resources (Gavin et al. 2018). At the same time, complex
environmental change such as climate change can become
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a catalyst for changes in values (O’Brien and Wolf 2010).
Crisis triggered by natural hazards shortens even more the
feedbacks between values as drivers and outcomes. As such,
the opportunity space for responses to risks is delineated and
shaped by deliberated, reconciled societal, communal and
group values, but at the same time, crisis may be the most
rapid trigger for radical changes in our principles and life
goals, and this in turn is likely to affect contextual values.
When the consequences of environmental changes become
evident for people, they may become more aware of the
diverse values of nature, compared to ‘normal’ times. Crises of natural resources or climate change thus can become
opportunities to form and (re-)connect to shared values
of nature if the focus is on how to think and act together
towards these values.
Further research is needed that considers to what degree
and how rapidly transcendental values can change, why a
focus on contextual factors and values may not be sufficient
(IPBES 2019), how does value change ‘ripple out’ (Everard
et al. 2016) to the societal and cultural level, what interventions are most effective at achieving such change, and to
what degree value change acts as a precursor to or an effect
of changing behaviour. There is also a need for interdisciplinary scholars to reconcile the approaches of value change
and value congruence, notably if wellbeing as a construct is
considered as much a process as an outcome, and to relate
individualistic processes such as mindfulness more strongly
to social values, socialisation processes and social outcomes.

Normativity and intention: valuation as descriptive
vs normative
The next tension relates to whether the formation and
understanding of social values is perceived as teleologically normative: a critical, emancipatory, and potentially
transformative affair (e.g. in this feature O’Connor and
Kenter 2019; Brear and Mbonane 2019; Horcea-Milcu
et al. 2019; Ravenscroft 2019), or as descriptive: an objective, empirical exercise (e.g. Christie et al. 2019b; Raymond
and Raymond 2019), which nonetheless may include the
observation of transformative social values (e.g. Fordham
and Robinson 2019). Through a critical meta-lens, (shared)
social values can be seen as a (shared) understanding of
the common good. The ethical and political considerations
of this critical meta-lens beg questions about how conclusions are drawn and knowledge might be advanced, and to
what degree deliberation should be grounded in democratic
ideals (Ravenscroft 2019) or derived from people’s lived
experience (Brear and Mbonane 2019). However, this raises
important questions of procedural and recognition justice,
of what, and whose perspectives should be included within
consideration of the common good and by what criteria
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this can be validated. Though the emancipatory tradition
typically focuses on maximising inclusion (Lo and Spash
2012; Orchard-Webb et al. 2016), this does not mean that
all individual values should be included or aggregated, for
example where they do not serve society as a whole (Sagoff
1986), or are incompatible with sustainability (Menzel and
Green 2013).
Interestingly, a similar tension between descriptive and
normative exists with regard to relational values, that can be
discussed as a matter for observation (Calcagni et al. 2019;
Klain et al. 2017) or an agenda for inclusion and emancipation of non-scientific knowledge (Gould et al. 2019; Stålhammar and Thorén 2019). However, while relational values
are not generally put forward as ‘better’ than instrumental
ones, the normative tradition clearly advocates social values
as more desirable than individual ones for the purpose of
decision-making, as long as the conditions of procedural
and recognition justice are reasonably satisfied (Howarth and
Wilson 2006; Irvine et al. 2016; Kenter et al. 2016b; Ravenscroft 2019; Zografos and Howarth 2010). This relates also
to the dimension of intention on the value lens: when valuation is seen as transformative, it is unlikely that this purpose
seeks values to be more self-regarding. Rather, social values
are seen as oriented towards more other-regarding perspectives and the consideration of society as a whole (and which
may also include non-humans; O’Connor and Kenter 2019;
Gould et al. 2019). From this perspective, the individual
self-regarding preferences associated with market decisions
should not be transferred to the social value domain of the
group, or public policy (Mauss 1954; Lo and Spash 2012;
Kenter et al. 2014a; Irvine et al. 2016; Ravenscroft 2019).
As Sagoff (1986, p303) put it: “Why is it good in itself that a
person who wants a Mercedes succeed in getting one? Having a preference is a reason for the person who has it to try to
satisfy it. Why should it be a goal of public policy, however
to satisfy that preference?”.
However, the clear division of self-regarding consumer vs
more other-regarding citizen values is seen by some lenses
as an abstraction, such as in care ethics and relational axiology, where identities and values are seen as defined by
embodied, reciprocal relationships and values, and where
self and other are not discretely separated as different objects
of regard (Held 2006; Muraca 2016; Gould et al. 2019).
The tension relating to the intention and normativity
dimensions of value and epistemic lenses can in part be
resolved by recognising that different positions along these
dimensions typically correspond to differences at value lens
dimensions of scale, provider and concept and the procedural lens dimension of process. Normative meta-lenses
are particularly focused on shared and social values in the
sense of value to society, formed through a shared social
process, and/or expressed by non-individual value-providers. Transcendental values, particularly those relating to
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environmental sustainability and social justice, are important in the sense that they are seen as ends that steer those
processes and that play an important role in contextual value
formation, but they are not generally the primary objective
of study. There is a goal of providing evidence for interventions, but the social valuation itself can also be seen
as an intervention to transform values and/or behaviour
or challenge existing institutions. In contrast, descriptive
meta-lenses more typically focus on either social values as
aggregated individual values, or social values in the sense of
transcendental values, mostly by individual providers, and
the relations between transcendental and contextual values
and behaviour to provide evidence for exogenous interventions. In a small number of studies, the two approaches have
been successfully combined where descriptive approaches
inform or are integrated with consequent deliberation on the
common good (Kenter 2016b; Kenter et al. 2016b; Raymond
et al. 2014; Raymond and Kenter 2016; Borsuk et al. 2019).
Martino et al. (2019) illustrate that the need for descriptive vs normative valuation also depends on endogenous
characteristics of different environmental goods, and how
these characteristics interact with social institutions. Further research may consider more deeply when descriptive
and normative approaches are most appropriate and when
combinations of both add particular value. There is also a
need for more explicit evaluations of recognition and procedural justice in critical social valuation, and to what degree,
and under which conditions, the transformative objectives
of social valuations are met.

Value justifications and frames: shared, social
and relational values and our relationship
with the natural world
In recent years, the increasing emphasis on social values
within the sustainability field has arisen in parallel with
increased attention to relational values, particularly with
regard to ecosystem assessment (e.g. Chan et al. 2018,
2016; Muraca 2016; IPBES 2016; Christie et al. 2019b).
Several contributions to this feature have considered relational values and their relation with shared, social, instrumental and intrinsic values (Calcagni et al. 2019; Stålhammar and Thorén 2019; Gould et al. 2019; O’Connor and
Kenter 2019). Both relational and social strands of thinking evolved, at least in relation to ecosystem assessment
and valuation, from increasing recognition of the limitations of mainstream economic valuation and its instrumental value assumptions. This opened up a fuzzy field of nonmonetary, social, cultural or sociocultural values, largely
associated with the study of cultural ecosystem services
and to some degree indigenous and local knowledge systems, that used a wide array of methods but without much
attention to underpinning value, epistemic and procedural
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lenses (Raymond et al. 2014; Scholte et al. 2015). Two
interventions signalled different directions: Kenter et al.
(2014a, 2015) focused on clarifying the concept, dimensions and types of shared and social values as critiques of
the pre-formed, individualist and self-regarding assumptions of mainstream valuation. While shared and social
values were considered largely synonymous, social values
tended to emphasise social scales whereas shared values
tended to refer to social value providers and the outcomes
of collective value formation. This discourse (further
developed in a special issue of Ecosystem Services,
October 2016, mostly by authors associated with the UK
National Ecosystem Assessment follow-on; Kenter, 2016a)
articulates strongly the social nature of values and the long
and short-term processes for socialisation and internalisation of values, with particular regard for integrating deliberative and interpretive approaches as a preferred methodology for assessing shared values (e.g. Orchard-Webb et al.
2016; Edwards et al. 2016; Ranger et al. 2016). Relational
values, in the sense of values pertaining to meaningful,
non-substitutable relationships between people and their
environment, were considered, but primarily from a perspective of their shared-ness within groups, communities,
cultures and societies.
In a different intervention, Chan et al. (2016) defined relational values as preferences, principles, and virtues pertaining to relationships. They argue that in practice the instrumental and intrinsic value concepts central to environmental
ethics did not capture what matters most to people, and that
a distinct bridging concept was needed. This concept has
since been elevated to central importance in IPBES (Pascual
et al. 2017; Díaz et al. 2018; Christie et al. 2019b). As with
social values, the scope of relational values is broad and
fuzzy (Stålhammar and Thorén 2019). Relational values can
refer to the ethical nature of value as being anthropocentric,
yet non-instrumental, in the sense of not open to trade-off
(Díaz et al. 2015; Himes and Muraca 2018); or it can relate
to the content of transcendental or contextual values as
pertaining to relationships (Klain et al. 2017; Gould et al.
2019); or it can refer to a ‘relational field’ as the source of
value, rather than the value object or subject (Muraca 2011,
2016). Importantly, while the dichotomy between intrinsic
and instrumental is typically conveyed as a major tension in
environmental debates, Stålhammar and Thorén (2019) point
out that these value types are somewhat caricatured, and that
environmental ethics has long had more nuanced interpretations of instrumental and intrinsic values that are inclusive
of relational value justifications (e.g. Naess 1973). As such,
the ambition of the relational intervention is perhaps more
pragmatic than theoretical, in advancing recognition of the
relational nature of how people talk and think about values
(Chan et al. 2018).
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Fig. 4  The Life Value Framework, and the relation between its four
frames and instrumental, relational and intrinsic value justifications
(adapted from O’Connor and Kenter 2019). ES ecosystem services,
NCP nature’s contributions to people

Relational values as a boundary concept has thus strategically focused on the dimension of justification. In contrast, the challenges posed by shared and social values to
instrumental values are not resolved by developing a noninstrumental concept, but by pointing to the importance of
the collective level, understanding the intersubjectivity of
values, and development of pluralistic boundary concepts
and processes for sharing, aggregating and integrating values that are inclusive of multiple value justifications. As
such, shared and social values, and relational values, are
complementary constructs both essential for inclusive valuation. Furthermore, the two are closely related; it is hard
to imagine any relational values that are not in one dimension or another shared or social (Ishihara 2018), and relationships with nature and place are central in environmental social value formation processes (Kenter 2016a; Ranger
et al. 2016; Edwards et al. 2016; Ainsworth et al. 2019;
Calcagni et al. 2019; Gould et al. 2019).
An altogether different approach to inclusively communicating values is presented by O’Connor and Kenter (2019),
who build on O’Neill et al. (2008) to develop the Life
Framework of Value, which moves beyond value justifications to consider valuation in terms of different frames. Here,
values are presented simply as what matters, and in relation
to the environment this can be framed as living from, with,
in and as the world (Fig. 4). Living from reflects the value
of the world as a resource, providing for our sustenance and
livelihoods. Living in the world points to its role as place,
as the stage for our lives. Living with the world points to
non-human nature as the other, with whom we co-exist, and
which has its own purposes, patterns and cycles. Living as
the world points to more-than-human nature as self, with
nature and non-humans constitutive of our bodies, psyche
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and spirit individually and collectively, through for example kinship, embodiment, and non-dual spiritual experience
(O’Connor and Kenter 2019).
Importantly, while relational values may be particularly
associated with living in and as frames, and intrinsic and
instrumental values with the with and from frames, the
different justifications straddle the frames, pointing to the
entwinement of multiple ethical categories in our common
experience. For example, a farmer clearing forest for shifting cultivation may be seen through a living from frame, but
his livelihood is also likely to be the source of meaningful,
non-substitutable relational values, and his clearing activities could support the intrinsic good of biodiversity (e.g.
Bayliss-Smith et al. 2003). The authors note that “O’Neill’s
way of phrasing values in relation to ‘living’ intuitively
imbues a sense of egalitarianism between different values”
and “its elegance incites a natural inclination towards including each of the categories [in valuations and decision-making]” (p. × 2). Differentiating between value frames may be
an easier way of communicating nature’s values to a broad
audience than through more abstract value justifications.
However, further research and debate is needed to better align the need to communicate values effectively in a
way that resonates with citizens and policy makers, such as
through the Life Framework and relational values, with rigorous explanation of the relationships between different categories. Further, research is needed that builds on discourses
and approaches associated with shared and social values to
find ways of resolving practical tensions in sustainability
practice between different value justifications and frames,
enabling more effective value integration.

Value integration and rationalities
Different forms of value integration were presented in this
Special Feature. Papers examined the integration of different
types of values, including for example across different scales
of values (van Riper et al. 2019) and provider (Kendal and
Raymond 2019; Fordham and Robinson 2019) and across
different value justifications (Christie et al. 2019b; O’Connor
and Kenter 2019; Kronenberg and Andersson 2019). Integration becomes more complex when aligning between
epistemic lenses that differ in terms of abstractness and
constructedness (Rawluk et al. 2019), for example between
values that are lived or embodied, where value is seen as
dynamically situated (Raymond et al. 2017) and more objective approaches where values are seen as stable across situations. Such questions point to an urgent need to consider new
forms of value integration. Gunton et al. (2017) argued that
we need value frameworks that can integrate the place of
interest and the scale and subject of interest. They proposed
a suite of considerations for valuing ecosystems (e.g. social,
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economic, aesthetic, jural, sensory, symbolic), to be compared with different stakeholder groups and across different
types of places. These frameworks point to the difference
between concept and method integration (Kronenberg and
Andersson 2019; Guerrero et al. 2018), although arguably
method integration needs to be underpinned by conceptual
integration, at least if one wishes to avoid unconscious pragmatism where no attention is given to how tensions along
different lenses are resolved (Raymond et al. 2014). Most
social values for sustainability papers do not discuss the
interface between conceptual and methodological integration, and this is an important avenue for future research.
Value integration can achieve different levels or purposes.
Kronenberg and Andersson (2019) distinguished full integration through a single measure, comparison of results from
selected combinations of methods, and parallel use where
there are multiple difficult to compare sets of values. The
level of value integration achievable will depend on the
degree to which values and value dimensions are deemed
logically and axiologically commensurable and value indicators and valuation methods technically compatible.
Different integration levels tend to be informed by different epistemic lens perspectives, including with regard to
rationality. Full integration and its demands for commensurability is strongly tied to instrumental rationality (Lockwood 2005). Here the focus is on the choice of suitable indicators where different values are traded-off in the search for
an optimal outcome. Values are treated as commensurable
by looking to measure them according to a common scale
and thus aggregated into a single value indicator, such as
through monetisation and many forms of multi-criteria
analysis. More limited combination approaches can be
linked with bounded rationality, where doing well enough
rather than optimising choices is inevitable in many contexts
(Simon 1984). Here, incommensurable values may be compared ordinally or nominally (e.g. improvement vs degradation). Values from different methods can also be brought
together on the basis of communicative rationality, where
values are weighted on the basis of the force of argument
rather than analytical criteria, and the realisation of ideals
of non-coercion and inclusivity determines to what degree
outcomes are rational (Habermas 1984). Here, plural values may be thought of as weakly comparable, which means
they should only be compared in terms of practical judgement, rather than on a common scale (Martínez-Alier et al.
1998). For example, O’Connor and Kenter (2019) propose
the integration of intrinsic, instrumental and relational values through discussion structured according to the multiple Life Frames, where people are invited to reflect on how
different policy scenarios might affect both people and the
more-than-human world. Irvine et al. (2016), Kenter (2016a)
and Ravenscroft (2019) point out philosophical challenges
around deliberative value integration, relating to how much
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different representations and value criteria count, and urging
further empirical investigation of how deliberative valuations can act as new democratic spaces for integration based
on social learning and communicative rationality.
Given these different value integration rationalities, how
can policymakers recognise the diverse values of nature?
Here, we need to accept the rationality of ‘value pluralism’
in that value diversity is an outcome itself. Diverse authors
(e.g. Larmore 1987; Kekes 1993) have argued that conflicts between values are not always resolvable. The notion
of moral conflict (Stocker 1990) suggests that ethics need
not always be action guiding. Instead, respecting plurality
involves recognition of diverse pathways of policy formation
and implementation. This will require a shift in the culture of
policy making and associated capacity building to promote
awareness of diverse value traditions and practice in grappling with multiple value lenses and meta-lenses. In terms
of deliberation, the principal outcome sought may not be
the kind of consensus solutions associated with Habermasian ideals, but providing a forum for plurality, capacity and
trust-building. Furthermore, even where values cannot be
agreed, it may still be possible to agree on shared meta-values around how to deal with divergent or conflicting values
and lenses.

Values, conflict and power
The consideration of plural values and the challenges of
integrating them with each other and into decisions raises
key questions of power in navigating such conflicts. Despite
real consequences, the interplay between values and power
continue to be neglected, especially in empirical valuation
studies. This is in part due to the multifaceted nature of
both values and power. Power can be both overt and almost
imperceptible and exercised through hegemonically privileging certain lenses and meta-lenses (Foucault 1980; Lukes
2005). Power dynamics can influence whose values are
expressed or recognised, and which values emerge in contexts, though this is not necessarily transparent. Researchers and practitioners of sustainability science must become
attuned to recognising and navigating power as expressed
through values and the lenses by which we examine them.
The interplay between social values and power can occur
in many ways. A dominant scientific framing of sustainability privileges one way of knowing, which can depoliticise inherently political challenges (Sletto 2008). Examples include the concepts of the Anthropocene (Haraway
et al. 2015) and sustainability itself (Ferreira 2017), which
homogenise social drivers apolitically. Consciously or
unconsciously privileging one set of social value lenses over
others can manifest in social–ecological injustices (Collard
et al. 2018). Certain values (e.g. economic, moral, religious,
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scientific, etc.) of particular groups (e.g. different social
classes) will be favoured in policy and decision-making
through exercise of power, for example through privileging
of economic value above all else (Demaria 2010). In contrast, lenses and languages of valuation, and consequently
values, associated with indigenous and local knowledge systems are often ignored in decision-making (Martinez-Alier
2009; Christie et al. 2019b). Further, meta-values encapsulated in dominant lenses, including ideas of social memory
and how the future should be (Rawluk and Curtis 2016),
can cause people to silence values that don’t match expectations, including in deliberative processes (Orchard-Webb
et al. 2016; Lo and Spash 2012).
There are many ways in which power can be exercised in order to direct, control or regulate the conduct
of people, in overt and subtle ways (Foucault and Rabinow 1997), for example, through discursive strategies of
power–knowledge embedded in different ‘governmentalities’, such as Sovereignty, Discipline, Neoliberalism
and Truth, as an art of government (Foucault et al. 2008).
According to different technologies of power exerted in a
historical context, these governmentalities affect the values that people are able to adopt in their lives. Given that
values are crucial aspects of the choices, decisions, and
behaviours of people related to sustainability, the interplay
between how power is exercised, the values that people
adopt, and the construction of individuals’ identities is key
to understand environmental governance and its outcomes
(Agrawal et al. 2005; D’Alisa and Kallis 2016).
While ontological and epistemological differences can
be a source of contestation (Rawluk et al. 2019), tensions
around power inevitably arise in relation to any form of
social values assessment in practice, though are often not
acknowledged. In particular, there is a need for more attention to power relations in diverse processes of value formation, socialisation and internalisation, such as by Calcagni
et al. (2019) who consider the impact of communication
and market strategies influencing value creation on social
media. Even in deliberative value formation characterised by ideals of non-coercive communicative rationality,
such ideals can only be approximated, as in the real-world,
unconscious power relations cannot be fully ironed out
(Orchard-Webb et al. 2016; Kadlec and Friedman 2007).
Intractable controversies inevitably remain, demanding specific, contextual answers at the level of practice
(Pellizzoni 2001). Further, in sustainability practice, an
important barrier for realising pro-sustainability social
values are people’s limited power and control to change
their unsustainable practices resulting from unmet wellbeing-related needs (Brear and Mbonane 2019; Huxley and
Yiftachel 2000).
Thus, sustainability that manifests social–ecological
justice requires centring on both social values and power.
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If other-regarding transcendental values that underpin
the ethos of sustainability, such as equity, generosity and
care, are to be promoted, there is a precursory requirement
to transparently observe diversities of values and needs
alongside privileging mechanisms of power. In the field of
valuation, scholars may need to become more comfortable
with relational and post-structuralist meta-lenses, since
power is observed more easily through these (Foucault
1980). In line with Geels et al. (2017), Smith et al. (2005)
and Everard et al. (2016), considering values through
multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses is critical
because socio-technical transition pathways towards sustainable systems imply necessarily value-oriented governance systems, which are affected by the interplays between
technologies of power, the institutional system, and the
processes of pro-sustainability value socialisation.

Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered key theoretical and practical tensions in the burgeoning field of social values of
sustainability. These tensions relate to important dimensions of values that characterise the lenses and epistemic
and procedural meta-lenses through which different traditions conceive and perceive these values. Key avenues for
future research relating to these tensions include:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Exploration of relations between collective and individual values, and the dynamic internalisation and
socialisation processes by which values transfer up and
down between individuals and multiple social scales of
value provider;
Investigation of crisis-triggers for pro-sustainability
value-change and levers for ‘rippling out’ changes;
Conceptual development and empirical exploration of
proto-values;
Application of interventions based on value awareness,
activation and congruence within sustainability contexts and their upscaling from individualistic to social;
Evaluation of values-based interventions that take a
generalised vs place-based perspective;
Further development of the Life Framework as a novel
way of organising and communicating why the natural
world matters;
The interface between value, conceptual and methodological pluralism, value integration and comparative
and combined use of multiple rationalities for valuation;
Deliberative mechanisms to address conflicts between
values at different spatiotemporal and social scales,
between different value justifications and Life Frames
and between different value and epistemic lenses;
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9.

More explicit evaluations of recognition and procedural justice in critical social valuation, and under
which conditions transformative objectives of social
valuations are met;
10. The interplay between how power is exercised and the
values that people adopt across different institutions
and contexts;
11. The development of new languages of valuation that
are better reflective of relational, constructivist and
poststructuralist perspectives;
12. Understanding mechanisms whereby certain lenses are
privileged over others in different decision-contexts,
and capacity building for understanding and drawing
on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses in
decision-making.
The large number of dimensions of values to which these
questions point reflect that sustainability issues are by and
large complex and wicked problems. Addressing such issues
requires us to navigate transcendental and contextual values
at multiple spatiotemporal scales, between individuals and
collectives, across different potentially conflicting value justifications, frames and rationalities, and with close attention
to power relations in such conflicts, both within and between
different value articulating institutions. Effective navigation
requires charts, beacons and experience. This paper has
sought to scout the terrain providing a multidimensional
interpretation of the messy social values landscape. Such
a map is crucial in communicating with fellow travellers
where one is, in the sense of what values one is articulating
and from which vantage point. Understanding of tensions
provides beacons to shed light on crucial areas of conflict,
where we need to pay particular attention in our journeys of
sustainability science and practice. At these points, experience of engaging not just with the landscape and its map
but with fellow travellers becomes vital, as the terrain is
too challenging for any tradition to tackle on its own. Crucially, all values around sustainability have a social dimension. A juxtaposition between individual instrumental values
and social, shared, cultural, non-instrumental or relational
values is thus not helpful—rather we must help each other
understand what dimensions of the value landscape we are
viewing and through what lens. At these junctions, by loving the mess and enjoying the thrill of exploration, conflict
can become a space of creative dynamism where new concepts, methods and approaches can be born. The mess does
not need resolving but engaging with. This requires building capacity with researchers and practitioners: learning to
navigate and learning to love, by embracing the plurality of
how we conceive and articulate values in research, decision
mechanisms and boundary spaces—all are ultimately social
processes of valuation.
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